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This Article sketches an outline of Chief Justice McKusick's com-
mon law jurisprudence.1 The Article provides a model only, a sug-
gested characterization of the Chief Justice's jurisprudence based
upon the Author's reading of a significant number of his court opin-
ions. Since it is intended as an outline only, the Article confines it-
self to a careful examination of only three of the over seven hundred
court decisions authored by Chief Justice McKusick; a more exten-
sive examination will have to be left to another time. Nevertheless,
the Author has found those three decisions representative of Chief
Justice McKusick's common law method, and particularly helpful in
understanding his jurisprudence.
This Article suggests that Chief Justice McKusick practices a
common law jurisprudence best described as "Law as Integrity."
2
That jurisprudence, as explained by Professor Ronald Dworkin, in-
* Associate, Drummond, Woodsum, Plimpton & MacMahon. B.A., University of
Maine at Orono; Ph.D., Columbia University; J.D., University of Maine School of
Law. The Author was a law clerk for Chief Justice McKusick in 1987-1988.
1. This Article distinguishes a common law jurisprudence from a statutory juris-
prudence. The former addresses the legal force of prior judicial decisions in areas not
explicitly addressed by statute. The latter looks to the legal character of legislative
actions. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EPIRE 313-55 (1986). Chief Justice McKusick's stat-
utory jurisprudence bears some similarity to his common law methodology, in that he
recognizes that legal reasoning concerning one statute may carry precedential weight
when interpreting a different statute that addresses similar concerns. See, e.g., Maine
Human Rights Comm'n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (when
interpreting Maine Human Rights Act, the court may consider federal case law inter-
preting analogous federal statutes).
Finally, one could also identify a constitutional jurisprudence, given the special
considerations that arise when addressing constitutional questions. See, e.g.. McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("it is a constitution we are
expounding").
2. The appellation, "Law as Integrity," was developed by Professor Ronald Dwor-
kin in LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 1. This Article borrows heavily on Professor Dwor-
kin's description of Law as Integrity, and finds that description to best characterize
Chief Justice McKusick's common law method. Professor Dworkin has developed his
legal philosophy over time, and its essential parts can be seen in a number of his
earlier works. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977); R. Dwoanm,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146-77 (1985).
The Author's discussion of Law as Integrity is not intended to be original. Rather,
the thesis of this Article is that Professor Dworkin's Law as Integrity jurisprudence
provides a helpful model for understanding the Chief Justice's common law
methodology.
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sists upon the integrity of the law - on developing a coherent body
of law over time through individual court decisions. Under Law as
Integrity, individual court decisions should draw upon and reflect
the judge's best interpretation of the general principles, legal and
moral, that characterize the legal tradition. Thus the law that con-
trols a case is more than any particular collection of court deci-
sions-it includes as well the general principles implicit in those de-
cisions. The judge in hard cases is bound to respect not just those
prior legal holdings, but also general principles underlying those rul-
ings. Because Law as Integrity requires judges to look for and re-
spect those general principles implicit in the legal tradition, practi-
tioners of this jurisprudence see judicial decisions not simply as
controlling precedents when "on point," but also as useful indicators
of the meaning of a more complex legal "text," even when not
controlling.
In short, Law as Integrity views the law as that seamless web first
noted by Frederick Maitland in his review of the history of English
law.3 Individual court decisions are connected by broader strands of
explanatory principle, which in turn give coherence to the law. Judi-
cial decisionmaking within that web, therefore, should respect and
add to its overall coherence. Consequently, the normative force of
particular court decisions arises out of the degree to which those de-
cisions respect the integrity of the law.
This Article begins with an overview of the jurisprudence of Law
as Integrity, setting forth its basic components.4 Following that dis-
cussion, the Article turns to three opinions by Chief Justice McK-
usick as case studies linking his jurisprudence with Law as Integ-
rity." The Article ends with a brief discussion of why Law as
Integrity is the appropriate judicial method for judges resolving un-
certain questions of law.'
The first of the three cases to be examined, Bell v. Town of
Wells,7 involved the scope of the public's easement to use intertidal
beachfront in the Town of Wells, otherwise held in fee simple by the
upland landowner." Despite the great controversy spurred by the
Bell decision in the pages of this journal and elsewhere," the case
3. See F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 LAw QUAR-
TERLY REVIEW 13 (1898); see also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW, (2d ed. 1899).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Parts If-IV.
6. See infra Part V.
7. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
8. Id. at 169.
9. See, e.g., Delogu, Intellectual Indifference - Intellectual Dishonesty: The Co-
lonial Ordinance, The Equal Footing Doctrine, and the Maine Law Court, 42 MAINE
L. REV. 43 (1990); Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42
MAINE L. REV. 5 (1990). See also Beem, The Majority is in the Minority, Me. Times,
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presents a straightforward example of Chief Justice McKusick's Law
as Integrity jurisprudence. As an example of that jurisprudence, it
was in fact a relatively easy case.
The second and third cases to be discussed further establish the
interpretive character of the Chief Justice's common law method
and link it more firmly with Law as Integrity. The second case, Es-
tate of Worthley,10 involved a question of will interpretation, albeit
in a difficult context. The third, In re Gardner," presented the
painful question of when life-sustaining medical treatment could be
discontinued. In both those decisions, Chief Justice McKusick had
to go beyond particular precedents to more general legal principles
that appeared to characterize the case law at issue, and then relied
upon his interpretation of those general principles to help resolve
the particular questions before him. In Estate of Worthley, the
background theory relied on by Chief Justice McKusick narrowly
characterizes will construction. In re Gardner, however, finds the
Chief Justice drawing upon broader moral principles that appear for
him to be at least partially definitional of the Anglo-American com-
mon law tradition.
I. AN OUTLINE OF LAW AS INTEGRITY
This Article begins with the premise that a judge's jurisprudence
is made clear primarily through his resolution of hard cases.2 When
legal precedents or the wording of a statute clearly spells out the
rights and duties of particular parties, a judge's role is easy and his
decision is of little relevance to an understanding of his jurispru-
dence.13 With a hard case, however, legal rights and duties are not
clearly spelled out, either in relevant precedents or in the language
Apr. 21, 1989, at 7.
10. 535 A.2d 433 (Me. 1988).
11. 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987).
12. The Article follows Professor Dworkin's emphasis on "hard cases" as central
to the recognition of a judge's jurisprudential method. See R DwoRKIN, TAKING
RiGrrs SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 81-130 (1977).
13. The exception to this rule is when social developments bring to light that par-
ticular precedents, once clearly established, no longer reflect the more general legal or
moral principles upon which the law is based. A case that once would not have ap-
peared difficult now has become so. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Principles of stare decisis then come to the fore, and a court must wrestle
with when the gravitational force of legal principles implicit in other court decisions
and the law generally compel that a prior decision be overruled. The Law Court has
set forth standards for determining when a prior decision should be overruled. See
Comeau v. Maine Coastal Servs., 449 A.2d 362, 371 (Me. 1982) (Carter, J., concur-
ring); Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 1000 (Me. 1982). Those standards include the
erosion of those legal principles that formerly supported the decision. See Myrick v.
James, 444 A.2d at 1000. See also Note, City of Portland v. DePaolo: Defining the




of a statute. Nevertheless, a controversy exists and litigants are
before the court demanding an answer. How a particular judge goes
about resolving those hard cases and what resources the judge is
able to draw upon, give clear indication of that judge's jurispru-
dence. In keeping with this basic premise, this Article finds in Chief
Justice McKusick's resolution of three hard cases the outline of his
Law as Integrity jurisprudence.
A. Competing Jurisprudential Methods
Recent history presents us with two strong competing jurispru-
dential theories about how hard cases are resolved. One school of
thought suggests that the law is fully contained within clearly estab-
lished sources - the Constitution, statutes, and the holdings of
prior court decisions - and when those sources of law do not de-
clare a particular right, no right can be said to exist." Judges exceed
their authority when they move beyond the declarations of law in
those sources to recognize new rights previously not contained in the
law.' 5 This school of thought has been described in its various forms
as legal conventionalism, but has more popularly been identified as
a form of judicial restraint."6 An alternative school of thought holds
that the law is simply what judges say it is in particular cases, and
that judges in deciding cases should generally attempt to do what
they think is best for the community in those circumstances. Profes-
sor Dworkin identifies this jurisprudence as legal pragmatism, 7 but
it also may characterize legal realism. 8 It appears generally to corre-
14. Professor Dworkin identifies this school of jurisprudence as "conventional-
ism." See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 114-17. See generally id. at 114-50 (broadly
discussing the jurisprudence of conventionalism).
15. In LAW's EMPIRE, Professor Dworkin recognizes that in certain strands of con-
ventionalism, a judge may properly move beyond the law and declare new rights. The
important point, however, is that the newly recognized right in no sense existed
before its judicial recognition. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 118-20. Neither
party, that is, had a legal right to a decision in his or her favor.
16. Id. In Taking Rights Seriously, Professor Dworkin appears to be discussing
conventionalism when he examines the popular conception of judicial restraint. R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 136-38. Robert Bork has de-
scribed another version of this jurisprudence in the constitutional context as
"originalism." See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). See also Bork, Neu-
tral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 1 (1971). Con-
ventionalism need not require judicial restraint, however. See supra note 15.
17. See R DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 95, 151-75. Professor Dworkin notes that
this view of the law in essence assumes there is no such thing as legal rights that
compel particular responses by judges when called into play. Id. at 152.
18. Professor Dworkin draws this comparison with some justification. See id. at
153. Oliver Wendall Holmes, a precursor of the legal realism movement, noted that
"[ihe prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law." 0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 173 (1920). For a general discussion of legal realism (or "rule-skepticism"),
see H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-44 (1961). Legal realism is alive and well
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spond with what is popularly known as judicial activism.
One of the problems shared by both schools of jurisprudence,
however, is that they assume that when litigants come before the
court with a hard case involving uncertain rights, neither party has a
legal claim that the case should be resolved in a certain way. They
may each appear to offer legal reasons, and may also employ politi-
cal or practical arguments in their own behalf, but neither party can
be understood as having a legal right to any particular resolution of
the matter. For conventionalism generally, the litigant will lose
when there are no clearly declared legal rights supporting the liti-
gant's cause. For legal pragmatism, the result will more likely de-
pend on the political perspective of the judge."9 But in each case, the
litigant in a hard case comes into court without a legal right to the
result sought.
B. Law as Integrity
Most students and practitioners of the law recognize that legal
precedents do not run out in the manner suggested by either the
legal realist or conventionalist. 20 Even when legal precedents are not
on point, the parties nevertheless carry into court claims of right
based upon legal principles that appear to underpin and explain the
in Maine in its more cynical forms. See e.g., Simmons, A Window of Vulnerability, 40
MAINE L REv. 19 (concluding that the Law Court practices "result-oriented" juris-
prudence). See also Herlan, Letter to the Editor MAINE L Rv., Oct. 1988, at 2 (con-
testing Mr. Simmon's comments).
Professor Dworkin also links the new Critical Legal Studies movement with legal
pragmatism. See R DWORKIN, supra note 1, 271-74. Both legal realism and critical
legal studies see judicial decisionmaking as essentially political in character. The crit-
ical legal theorists often see court decisions as advancing capitalist political ideolo-
gies, see e.g., Kairys, Introduction, in THE Pourics oF LAw 1. 4-6 (D. Kairys ed.
1982), whereas some legal realists understand the law as a positive social tool for
remaking society, see K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, REALISMs IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 42-74 (1962); J. AUSTIN, Lecture II, (1832) reprinted in J. AUSTIN, THE PROvINCE
OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 33
(1954).
19. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 148-50.
20. This Article assumes that the force of any particular jurisprudence arises at
least in part out of whether it describes with reasonable accuracy what judges and
lawyers in fact are doing when they argue about how a particular case should be
resolved. To the extent that an ideal theory of jurisprudence fails in a significant
sense to account for actual judicial decisionmaking, it should be revised as a poor
interpretation of the process it claims to be describing. See, e.g., R. DwOaIN, TAMNG
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 103-105. See also R. DWORKmN, supra note 1, at
65-68. John Rawls has described a similar process more fully in his account of a gen-
eral theory of justice.' See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20-21, 579-81 (1971)
(describing the process by which a theory of justice is developed as "reflective equi-
librium"). See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at
150-55 (discussing the concept of "reflective equilibrium" in Rawls' work); Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHILOSOPHY & PUaLIC AFFAIRS
223, 236 n.19 (1985) (commenting on Dworkin's comments).
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relevant case law. Law as Integrity assumes that those principles
constrain the judge's decisionmaking, and requires that the judge's
decision accord with the best interpretation of those underlying
principles. Professor Dworkin explains the process as follows:
A judge who accepts integrity will think that the law it defines sets
out genuine rights litigants have to a decision before him. They are
entitled, in principle, to have their acts and affairs judged in accor-
dance with the best view of what the legal standards of the commu-
nity required or permitted at the time they acted, and integrity
demands that these standards be seen as coherent, as the state
speaking with a single voice.21
In short, when poised for the resolution of a hard case, the common
law judge is neither fully free nor fully bound. The judge may pro-
claim rights that have not been recognized previously, but only
when those rights reflect the judge's best interpretation of the guid-
ing principles implicit in the relevant area of law.
Law as Integrity assumes, therefore, that implicit in the law are
general principles that explain and justify its character, and that a
judge faced with a hard case of uncertain law should draw upon his
best interpretation of those general principles, and use them to help
resolve the hard case in a manner consistent with the general princi-
ples. To explain this interpretive process, Professor Dworkin has
compared the law with various social practices,2 2 including games
such as chess,23 which can be understood as having a character of
their own. When faced with a hard case of rule interpretation within
that social practice, the adjudicator is not free to resolve the issue in
whatever way he or she pleases, but instead resorts to the best inter-
pretation of what the character of the practice is.2' The adjudicator
then attempts to answer the hard case in a way most consistent with
the character of the game as the adjudicator understands it -
thereby maintaining the integrity of the social practice. Different
people could interpret the character of the practice differently, and
in that sense the adjudicator's interpretation is a "contested con-
cept." 5 Yet the participants all agree that there is a character to the
practice and that hard cases should be resolved in accordance with
that character. Professor Dworkin describes the process as follows:
The hard case puts, we might say, a question of political theory. It
asks what it is fair to suppose the players have done in consenting
to [a particular] rule. The concept of a game's character is a con-
21. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 218.
22. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 62-65. In TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Profes-
sor Dworkin drew an analogy between the law and rules of courtesy such as removing
one's hat in church. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 53-58.
23. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 101-105.
24. See id. at 103.
25. Id. at 101-105.
[Vol. 43:321
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ceptual device for framing that question. It is a contested concept
that internalizes the general justification of the institution so as to
make it available for discriminations within the institution itself. It
supposes that a player consents not simply to a set of rules, but to
an enterprise that may be said to have a character of its own; so
that when the question is put - To what did he consent in con-
senting to that? - the answer may study the enterprise as a whole
and not just the rules."
Professor Dworkin expands on this process by describing three
stages in the resolution of a hard case within a social practice. The
first is a "preinterpretive stage" of identifying the rules and stan-
dards that seem clearly to characterize the practice.2 7 Drawing upon
his understanding of those rules and standards, the interpreter then
constructs a
general justification for the main elements of the practice identified
at the preinterpretive stage. This will consist of an argument why a
practice of that general shape is worth pursuing, if it is. The justifi-
cation need not fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice,
but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself
as interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one."
The interpreter then applies an understanding of the general char-
acter of the practice to the hard case, thereby maintaining the char-
acter of the practice while resolving the particular dispute.
20
Law as Integrity is premised on the understanding that law gener-
ally, or even a particular area within the law, is a social practice
having a character of its own. Given the complexity of the law, its
character could be described as "underdetermined" - that is, sub-
ject to a variety of reasonable interpretations as to its meaning. -0
But under Law as Integrity a judge accepts that there is a "charac-
ter to the game," and that a hard case should be resolved by draw-
ing upon the best interpretation of the general principles that justify
that practice." To the extent that the judge is successful, the integ-
rity of the law is maintained. Professor Dworkin explains:
Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be
both made and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a single,
coherent scheme of justice and fairness in the right relation. An
institution that accepts that ideal will sometimes, for that reason,
depart from a narrow line of past decisions in search of fidelity to
26. Id. at 104-105.
27. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 65-66.
28. Id. at 66.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 52-53.
31. In TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Professor Dworkin creates a fictitious judge,
Hercules, and then illustrates the interpretive process by depicting Judge Hercules'
resolution of a hard case of law. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra
note 2, at 105-30.
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principles conceived as more fundamental to the scheme as a
whole.3 12
Under the jurisprudence of Law as Integrity, the common law
judge is bound not simply by the particular holdings of earlier
courts, but also by that judge's interpretation of the general legal
principles that justify those earlier decisions. Thus, although the
earlier decisions do not themselves answer the hard case, the judge
nevertheless remains bound to resolve that hard case by applying
the judge's best interpretation of the principles behind those deci-
sions. Professor Dworkin explains the process as follows:
[Integrity] insists that the law - the rights and duties that flow
from past collective decisions and for that reason license or require
coercion - contains not only the narrow explicit content of these
decisions but also, more broadly, the scheme of principles neces-
sary to justify them.33
C. Law as Integrity and Interpretation
Clearly, the common law judge practicing Law as Integrity applies
a methodology that is essentially interpretive in nature."4 The inter-
pretive essence of this jurisprudence is important for a number of
reasons. First and foremost, it explains the manner in which the
judge's decisionmaking is constrained by past precedents. Second, it
explains the fluid and creative character of the common law method.
On the first point, the judge begins with the understanding that
there are in fact general legal principles that best justify the collec-
tion of disparate decisions relevant to the hard case presented. 0 The
judge's primary obligation in resolving that hard case is to develop
the best possible reconstruction of those legal principles and apply
them to the case at hand.3 6 Once that reconstruction has been com-
32. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 219.
33. Id. at 227.
34. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 45-86, 410-13; R. DWORKIN, A MATMR OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 146-66. The study of interpretation as a guide to social
practices (also known as hermeneutics) is fast growing. This Article will not review
that body of commentary. For those wishing to pursue that study as it relates to law,
see Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory,
Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REV. 815 (1990);
Wroth, The Constitution and the Common Law: The Original Intent about the Orig-
inal Intent, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 553 (1988); Note, Dworkin and Subjectivity in
Legal Interpretation, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1988); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
35. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
See infra Part V and accompanying text for a discussion of why judges and lawyers
should assume there are unifying principles implicit in the law, and why they should
respect those principles, once discerned.
36. As discussed supra at notes 26-33 and accompanying text, the law is most
helpfully viewed as an extremely complex social practice the meaning of which is
[Vol. 43:321
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pleted, the judge is strictly bound to apply those legal principles as
he or she understands them. In that sense, the judge is never free to
apply a personal moral or philosophical belief as a legislator might
be in resolving the hard case.37 The decisionnaking remains chan-
neled by the body of case law relevant to the issue, and the judge's
best interpretation of the principles explaining those cases.
The interpretive character of Law as Integrity also explains its
creativity, however.3 8 Unlike conventionalism, the judge is free to go
beyond the simple holdings of earlier decisions to draw upon his or
her best interpretation of the principles implicit in those decisions.
To the extent rights and duties at issue are clarified, consistent with
the underlying character of the law, the judge has created something
that was not clearly there beforehand. The judge has not just added
an additional holding to the common law pool, but has also added
an interpretive reconstruction of the principles involved. The chan-
neled creativity of Law as Integrity explains well the capacity of the
common law to grow and develop over time.3 9
Having provided a general outline of Law as Integrity, this Article
now turns to three of Chief Justice McKusick's legal opinions on
subject to a variety of reasonable interpretations. Thus, both litigants in a hard case
may in good faith believe they are legally entitled to win. Nevertheless, Law as Integ-
rity assumes that there is, in theory, one best interpretation of the character of the
law, which a judge must pursue when required for the resolution of a particularly
hard legal issue. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGrrs SERIOUSLY. supra note 2, at
279-90; R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINcIPLE, supra note 2, at 119-45. One reason for
this assumption is practical: the judge must resolve the case, and since the judge sees
his or her duty as maintaining the integrity of the law, the judge strives to develop
the very best interpretation of the practice at issue. On a more philosophical plane,
however, Law as Integrity depicts the political community as a moral actor that must
justify its actions in a morally consistent manner. See infra notes 140-50 and accom-
panying text. As Professor Dworkin explains, "We accept integrity as a political ideal
because we want to treat our political community as one of principle, and the citizens
of a community of principle aim not simply at common principles, as if uniformity
were all they wanted, but the best common principles politics can find." R DwoRuN,
supra note 1, at 263.
37. Law as Integrity, like any sensible jurisprudence, recognizes that a judge's per-
sonal predilections unavoidably shape the way cases are decided. See, e.g., R DWoR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 123.26. As the judge draws upon
more abstract legal and moral theories in an effort to conceptualize the law, the judge
becomes more likely to rely on personal political and moral convictions. Yet even at
this stage of the argument, the personal convictions of the judge practicing Law as
Integrity count only to the extent that the judge in fact believes that they best char-
acterize the law being interpreted. To the extent that those personal convictions fail
to do so, they should be disregarded by the judge in resolving the case. See K DwOR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SKiousLv, supra note 2, at 125-27.
38. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 4849, 220.
39. In re Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 23, 33 A. 652, 654 (1895) ("The common law would
ill deserve its familiar panegyric as the 'perfection of human reason,' if it did not




hard cases of uncertain law. In the first case, Bell v. Town of Wells,
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, had
before it a substantial amount of precedent defining the legal issues
presented by the case. The case therefore required less abstract con-
ceptualizing than would be necessary for a hard case in less charted
waters. It nevertheless depicts clearly the channeled character of
Law as Integrity when the legal principles at issue are fairly well
established. In Estate of Worthley and In re Gardner, however, we
see the Chief Justice moving into more amorphous areas of the law.
In the former, he finds the answer by drawing upon general princi-
ples characterizing will construction. In the latter, we see him look-
ing to more abstract background principles generally characteristic
of the common law.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO THE BEACHFRONT
INTERTIDAL ZONE
The Law Court's decision in Bell v. Town of Wells ("Bell II")10 is
interesting for a variety of reasons,41 but this Article examines it as
an example of Chief Justice McKusick's Law as Integrity jurispru-
dence. In particular, Chief Justice McKusick's opinion highlights
well the manner in which he isolates the legal precedents relevant to
a hard case of uncertain law, articulates the general legal concept he
understands to best characterize those precedents, and then relies
upon that general interpretive concept to shed light on the proper
answer to the particular hard case. The disagreement between Chief
Justice McKusick and the dissent in Bell II involved primarily the
freedom of the court to redefine the relevant text it had before it.
As is fairly well known by now, Bell II involved a quiet title action
brought by the owners of shoreland property in the Town of Wells,
bordering on Moody Beach.42 The landowners were seeking a declar-
atory judgment limiting use of the intertidal zone by members of the
public to fishing, fowling, and navigation. The various defendants
40. The case first went to the Law Court on appeal of a decision by the superior
court dismissing the quiet title action brought by the private landowners. The supe-
rior court had concluded that because the state was a "trustee of the public easement
in the intertidal zone," it was a necessary party to the action and consequently the
action against it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Bell v. Town
of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 510-11 (Me. 1986). The Law Court vacated that dismissal,
concluding that the state was not a necessary party since the public easement was not
in any sense "owned" by the state. Id. at 517. Accordingly, the quiet title action could
proceed. This Article refers to that decision as Bell I, and to the more recent Law
Court decision at 557 A.2d 168 as Bell II.
41. The Law Court also concluded that the Maine Legislature's Public Trust in
Intertidal Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (Supp. 1990-1991), un-
constitutionally deprived the plaintiffs of a property interest without just compensa-
tion. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 176-79. For a discussion of that aspect of
the holding, see Rieser, supra note 9.
42. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 169.
[Vol. 43:321
JURISPRUDENCE
and amici in the action urged the court to recognize a public ease-
ment to use the intertidal area for general recreational purposes,
and specifically for bathing, sunbathing, and recreational walking.
43
A majority of the Law Court held for the landowners, and Chief Jus-
tice McKusick wrote the majority opinion. Justice Wathen wrote a
carefully reasoned dissent, and the two opinions present a sharp
contrast in judicial methodologies.
4 '
A. The Pieces of the Puzzle Before the Law Court
Whatever one believes should have been the outcome in Bell II,
there can be little dispute about the relevant factors to be assessed
in reaching a decision.5 There was little difference between Chief
Justice McKusick and Justice Wathen on the legal precedents con-
sidered important to a decision or on the meaning of those prece-
dents. The real difference lay in how each justice understood his
own role in declaring the law in light of those precedents.
The historical backdrop of the case is found, of course, in the Co-
lonial Ordinance of 1641-48, which in essence first granted to private
upland owners a personal property interest in the intertidal area.'0
Prior to that time, the intertidal area had been held by the sover-
eign, both in his personal capacity and in trust for the public.'" By
1810, at the time the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided
Storer v. Freeman,8 it was well established that the principles set
forth in the Colonial Ordinance had become a part of Massachusetts
common law-
[B]ut from that time to the present an usage has prevailed, which
now has force as our common law, that the owner of lands bounded
43. When the case first went up to the Law Court, the court rejected the holding
that the State of Maine was a necessary party defendant to the action as "a trustee of
the public easement in the intertidal zone at Moody Beach." Bell v. Tom of Wells,
510 A.2d at 517. The state nevertheless remained a party to the action. See Bell v.
Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 170-71 n.8.
44. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 180-92 (Wathen, J., dissenting). Justice
Wathen was joined in dissent by Justices Roberts and Clifford.
45. Professor Delogu, however, strongly insists that the equal footing doctrine
should have altered the outcome of the case. See Delogu, supra note 9, at 53-64. Even
the dissent appeared to reject this proposition, however. See Bell v. Town of Wells,
557 A.2d at 181-82.
46. For a full discussion of the history of the Colonial Ordinance, as well as its
1641 and 1648 texts, see Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d at 511-14. See also Bell v.
Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 170-71; Cheung, Rethinking the History of the Seven-
teenth-Century Colonial Ordinance: A Reinterpretation of an Ancient Statute, 42
MAINE L. REv. 115 (1990); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Sub-
merged Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts, 37 MmIT
L REv. 105, 110-11 (1985).
47. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d at 511; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 11-13 (1894) (discussing the Crown's original authority over intertidal area).
48. 6 Mass. 435 (1810).
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on the sea or salt water shall hold to low water mark... but the
rights of others to convenient ways are saved .... 41
Those Massachusetts common law principles in turn became a
part of Maine common law when in 1820 the new Maine Constitu-
tion declared that "[a]ll laws now in force in this State, and not
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain, and be in force, until
altered or repealed by the Legislature ."5 If there were any
doubt regarding whether the Massachusetts common law rule on the
intertidal zone had become a part of Maine law at that time, the
doubt was resolved in 1831 by the Law Court in Lapish v. President
of the Bangor Bank,51 wherein the court reaffirmed the principles
set forth in Storer, and concluded that "the law on this point has
been considered as perfectly at rest.
'52
The Bell 11 decision, however, involved primarily the nature of
the public and private property interests in the intertidal zone,
rather than whether property interests existed at all. On this issue,
too, there was little disagreement on the bench regarding the legal
precedents relevant to those competing property interests"' - the
Law Court had addressed the scope of those property interests in
approximately a dozen cases between 1831 and 1925,54 and not at all
49. Id. at 438.
50. Me. Const. art. X, § 3. As described by the Law Court, that constitutional
provision was derived from section six of the Massachusetts Act of Separation of
1819. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d at 514 n.10.
51. 8 Me. 85 (1831).
52. Id. at 93. In light of that decision, Professor Delogu's argument regarding the
equal footing doctrine is simply inapplicable to the Bell case. See Delogu, supra note
9, at 53-64. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988), made absolutely clear that states newly admit-
ted to the Union were perfectly free to adopt common law principles that differed
from those of the original 13 states. Maine exercised its sovereignty in just this man-
ner both through Article X, section 3, of its new constitution and, if there were any
doubt, by judicial declaration in 1831 by the Lapish court. See Bell v. Town of Wells,
557 A.2d at 172.
The vituperative tone of Professor Delogu's article is odd, given the clear legal
precedents he was up against. See Delogu, supra note 9, at 44 (describing the Law
Court's decision as "intellectual dishonesty"). The weakness of Professor Delogu's
contention is seen in the fact that his central arguments are directed at the 1831
Lapish court. Id. at 58-59. The Lapish court, of course, was not alienating real prop-
erty when it reached its conclusion. Rather, it was summarizing Maine common law,
as formally adopted from Massachusetts through Article X, section 3, of the Maine
Constitution.
53. One difference, to be discussed infra at note 58, was the dissent's reliance on
the 1925 decision in Andrews v. King, 124 Me. 361, 129 A. 298 (1925). See Bell v.
Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 187 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
54. The Law Court recognized 15 Maine decisions between 1831 and 1925 as rele-
vant to the issue before it. See Andrews v. King, 124 Me. 361, 129 A. 298 (1925); State
v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875 (1909); Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37,
68 A. 527 (1907); Sawyer v. Beal, 97 Me. 356, 54 A. 848 (1903); Marshall v. Walker, 93
Me. 532, 45 A. 497 (1900); McFadden v. Haynes and DeWitt Ice Co., 86 Me. 319, 29
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since then until the Bell decisions in 1986 and 1989.", By the time
Bell 11 came before the Law Court, it was clearly established that
the upland owner held title to the intertidal zone in fee simple.50
Conversely, the public right to use that zone was in the nature of an
easement. 57 The question before the court was simply the scope of
that easement.
Chief Justice McKusick looked to the 155-year span of precedents
before the Law Court and concluded that the scope of the easement
at issue was unavoidably tied to an interpretation of the terms "fish-
ing, fowling, and navigation." He explained: "We have never, how-
ever, decided a question of the scope of the intertidal public ease-
ment except by referring to the three specific public uses reserved in
the Ordinance." 5 Thus the relevant case law provided Chief Justice
McKusick with a text, and he drew from that text the general legal
principle that the public has an easement to "fish, fowl, and navi-
gate." The court would interpret liberally what those particular
terms mean, Chief Justice McKusick observed, but the scope of the
easement is contained therein.
9
In reaching that conclusion, Chief Justice McKusick found irrele-
vant the Town's factual contention that the intertidal zone had been
used for many other purposes besides fishing, fowling, and naviga-
tion.6 0 Important for Chief Justice McKusick instead were the court
decisions themselves, in addition to the Colonial Ordinance. He
A. 1068 (1894); Snow v. Mount Desert Island Real Estate Co., 84 Me. 14, 24 A. 429
(1891); King v. Young, 76 Me. 76 (1884); Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441 (1882);
Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83 (1861); State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9 (1856); Moulton v. Libbey,
37 Me. 472 (1854); Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51 (1845); Moore v.
Griffin, 22 Me. 350 (1843); French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433 (1841); Lapish v. President of
the Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85 (1831).
55. Also of some relevance to the court as a whole was its 1952 decision in State v.
Lemar, 147 Me. 405, 87 A.2d 886 (1952), and the opinion by the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court in Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981). For a brief dis-
cussion of the special character of advisory opinions by the Supreme Judicial Court,
See Herlan, Book Review, 41 Mmss L Rav. 223, 228 & nn.35-37 (1989).
56. The Law Court had earlier reached that conclusion in Bell v. Town of Wells,
510 A.2d at 516; Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. at 536, 540, 45 A. at 498-499; State v.
Wilson, 42 Me. at 28.
57. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d at 516-17. See also Marshall v.
Walker, 93 Me. at 536, 540, 45 A. at 498-499. The United States Supreme Court had
also described the right of the upland owner as a fee interest subject to "public rights
of navigation and fishery." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1894).
58. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 173. The dissent in Bell H1 relies heavily on
Andrews v. King, 124 Me. 361, 129 A. 298 (1925) to establish a contrary conclusion.
See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 187-188. That decision, however, fits neatly
with Chief Justice McKusick's interpretation that the easement is limited to fishing,
fowling, and navigation and related uses. See Andrews v. King, 124 Me. at 363.64, 129
A. at 299 (noting right of navigation includes right to pass over flats for purpose of
entering on or departing from boat lawfully moored).
59. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 173.
60. Id. at 173-74.
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quoted at length from the Law Court's 1900 description of the scope
of the public easement for purposes of "navigation and of fishery":
Others may sail over them, may moor their craft upon them, may
allow their vessels to rest upon the soil when bare, may land and
walk upon them, may ride or skate over them when covered with
water bearing ice, may fish in the water over them, may dig shell-
fish in them, may take sea manure from them, but may not take
shells or mussel manure or deposit scrapings of snow upon the ice
over them. 1
For Chief Justice McKusick, the permitted uses were all "activities
related to those specified uses" of fishing, fowling, or navigation.62
Chief Justice McKusick also found the limited scope of the ease-
ment established by a number of decisions denying public use of the
intertidal zone. Thus in McFadden v. Haynes and DeWitt Ice Co.,c
the Law Court declared that the rights to the intertidal zone re-
served to the public do not include the right to cut ice from that
zone or the right to deposit within that zone snow scraped from ice
cut below low water . Further, in State v. Wilson," the Law Court
set aside an indictment for nuisance against an upland owner who
erected a wharf in the intertidal zone, thereby allegedly obstructing
a public way over those flats.6 In both cases, the court limited im-
portant public uses in light of the upland owner's fee interest in the
flats. Both cases make difficult a broader interpretation of the public
easement than the right to fish, fowl, and navigate.
In light of these precedents, Chief Justice McKusick could not
reasonably interpret the public easement at issue in a broader man-
ner - for example, as an easement to promote commerce.07 In Bar-
61. Id. at 174 (quoting Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. at 536.37, 45 A. at 498) (em-
phasis added by Bell II court).
62. Id. See also Moore v. Griffin, 22 Me. 350, 356 (1843) (in rejecting claimed
public right to remove mussel manure from flats, court declared that "[t]he language
of the reservation in the [Colonial O]rdinance cannot be extended beyond the obvious
meaning of the words fishing and fowling").
63. 86 Me. 319, 29 A. 1068 (1894). See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 173 n.16.
64. McFadden v. Haynes and DeWitt Ice Co., 86 Me. at 325, 29 A. at 1069. Coun-
sel for the defendant in McFadden emphasized the commercial importance for the ice
cutting industry of depositing snow on the flats. Id. at 323-24, 29 A. at 1068. The
interpretation of the public easement provided by the dissent in Bell II cannot rea-
sonably account for the McFadden decision, given the incontestable importance of
the Maine commercial ice industry, both for Maine and the world. Justice Wathen
nevertheless recognized the importance of McFadden to determining the scope of the
easement. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 187-88 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
65. 42 Me. 9 (1856).
66. Id. at 27-29. See also Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 65
(1845).
67. Both the dissent and Professor Delogu suggest such an alternative reading of
the relevant cases. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 185 (Wathen, J., dissent-
ing); Delogu, supra note 9, at 45-46. They both observe that the origins of the King's
original grant of a fee interest to the littoral landholder may have been for the pur-
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rows v. McDermott, the court had noted that the right to fish, fowl,
and navigate was not limited to those pursuing business or suste-
nance, but was available as well to those pursuing their personal
pleasures.6 8 Likewise, case law would not permit interpreting the
easement broadly to permit "all significant public uses."''° Such an
ambiguous characterization could not be reconciled, Chief Justice
McKusick reasoned, with the clearly declared fee simple property
interest of the upland owner.
7 0
Having drawn from the case law that the easement at issue was
restricted to "fishing, fowling, and navigation and related uses,'"'
Chief Justice McKusick then had no difficulty applying that general
principle to the claimed public rights of bathing, sunbathing, and
recreational walking. He explained simply that such activities could
not reasonably be understood as encompassed within the right to
fish, fowl, and navigate. 2
Further, Chief Justice McKusick emphasized that any interpreta-
tion of the easement as extending to bathing, sunbathing, and recre-
ational walking could not be contained on a "principled basis" from
becoming "a public easement for general recreation. 1 3 Chief Justice
McKusick continued: "To declare a general recreational easement,
the court would be engaging in legislating, and it would do so with-
out the benefit of having had the political processes define the na-
ture and extent of the public need.'
'74
B. Justice Wathen's Dissent
Justice Wathen's dissent in Bell 11 presents a sharp contrast to
Chief Justice McKusick's Law as Integrity method. Justice Wathen
pose of promoting commerce. See, e.g., Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810).
68. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 173 (citing Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me.
441, 449 (1882)).
69. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 174 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 365
Mass. 681, 688, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (1974)). That broad interpretation of the scope of
the easement is implicit in Justice Wathen's dissent, wherein he urged an under-
standing of the easement depending on "contemporary notions of usage and public
acceptance." Id. at 188 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 174. Chief Justice McKusick explained: "No decision of either the
Maine or the Massachusetts court supports any such open-ended interpretation of
the public uses to which privately owned intertidal land may be subjected." Id. See
also Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536-37, 45 A. 497-498 (1900) (noting landowner's
fee interest and right to appropriate intertidal zone to his exclusive use and posses-
sion); Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. at 449 (rejecting the proposition that the court
may change a general principle first declared in the Colonial Ordinance "if satisfied
that it does not operate beneficially under present circumstances").
71. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 174.
72. Id. at 173.
73. Id. at 176.
74. Id. The Chief Justice's concern on this point is seen also in Durepo v. Fish-
man, 533 A.2d 264, 265-66 (Me. 1987), wherein he insisted that courts should defer to
the Legislature's expertise in redrawing social policy.
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in large part agreed with the Chief Justice's discussion of the rele-
vant case law and the meaning of those cases.75 Justice Wathen
drew, for example, on the Law Court's 1843 statement that "[t]he
language of the reservation in the [Colonial 0]rdinance cannot be
extended beyond the obvious meaning of the words fishing and fowl-
ing." 7 6 Justice Wathen observed that even in 1894, the court "took a
more restrictive view of the public's right to encumber the fiat," re-
jecting an ice cutter's claimed right to throw snow scrapings on the
intertidal flats.7
Although Justice Wathen read the relevant cases in a way similar
to Chief Justice McKusick, he nevertheless reached a different con-
clusion, relying upon "current notions of usage" to resolve the issue:
Similarly, in the present controversy we should consider current
notions of usage and public acceptance. Although the practice of
fishing, fowling and navigation, as classically defined, may have be-
come less important, other recreational uses have developed and
received public acceptance within the past sixty years. I am per-
suaded that this Court and the Superior Court erred in arresting
further development in the law by effectively confining public
rights to those that had been recognized prior to 1925.78
Justice Wathen then found within those contemporary practices a
public right to recreational use of the flats at least "broad enough to
include such recreational activities as bathing, sunbathing and walk-
ing. 7 9 Justice Wathen looked to the "genius of the common law" to
explain his willingness to move beyond the principles otherwise im-
plicit in the relevant case law.80 He further explained that the com-
mon law must "expand with the progress of society and develop [in
accordance] with new ideas of right and justice."8 1 Yet in the end he
failed to set forth an account of the standards that should guide and
channel that development.
For Chief Justice McKusick, however, the interpretive character
of his jurisprudence establishes the channels through which the
common law should grow. In Bell II, Maine's common law easily
75. Id. at 185-88 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 187 (quoting Moore v. Griffin, 22 Me. at 356).
77. Id. at 187-88 (discussing McFadden v. Haynes and DeWitt Ice Co., 86 Me.
319, 29 A. 1068 (1894)).
78. Id. at 188. Unlike Chief Justice McKusick, Justice Wathen found relevant to
the issue before the court the legal doctrine of custom, concluding that "plaintiffs'
ownership is derived exclusively from customary law." Id. at 183-84 & nn.6-8. Justice
Wathen failed to make clear, however, in what manner that alternative statement of
the easement's origin would change the result in the case. He instead relied upon the




81. Id. (quoting In re Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 23, 33 A. 652, 654 (1895)).
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lent itself to the Chief Justice's principled and consistent interpreta-
tion of the public easement to use the intertidal zone. Having drawn
that interpretation from the relevant case law, Chief Justice McK-
usick's Law as Integrity jurisprudence would not permit him to de-
cide the case other than as he did. Although strong reasons of public
policy or personal philosophy might support a different conclusion,
the Chief Justice's interpretation of the relevant law would not.2
Once he had drawn from those cases his best interpretation of their
meaning, he was bound to apply that interpretation to the case
before him.85
I. ESTATE OF WORTHLEY A "HARD CASE" OF WILL
INTERPRETATION
Given Chief Justice McKusick's common law jurisprudence, the
Bell II case presented a fairly clear cut issue: the relevant case law
was well established, and those cases indicated with fair clarity that
the text being interpreted was the public's right to "fish, fowl, and
navigate," rather than a broader "right to recreate." In Estate of
Worthley,8 however, the Law Court faced a sketchier picture with
fewer precedents to guide its inquiry. Not only did the relevant case
law, scant as it was, fail to answer the issue faced by the court, but
also those decisions presented divergent lines of reasoning, thereby
requiring a reconciliation of rationales for a satisfactory answer to
the case. Chief Justice McKusick wrote the majority decision," and
his opinion reveals well the process by which a judge practicing Law
as Integrity may draw upon general principles that appear to ex-
plain the specific area of law at issue.
Estate of Worthley involved the issue of whether a general power
of appointment that was granted jointly by a will to three named
persons would survive the death of one of those persons.80 The pro-
82. In Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264-265 (Me. 1987), the Chief Justice empha-
sized that although a common law court has the "power" to create new rights, "the
possession of power does not by itself justify its use." The growth of the common law
instead must follow carefully the general principles characterizing the law.
83. It must be emphasized that Bell II was a hard case - that is, one of first
impression for the Court, with no easy answer. As noted supra at notes 34-39 and
accompanying text, resolution of a hard case requires interpretation of precedents
that do not themselves clearly answer the case at hand. Thus judges practicing Law
as Integrity act creatively, in that they attempt to construct the most reasonable in-
terpretation of the relevant case law. To the extent they succeed, they have identified
legal principles that were not clearly declared earlier. Once they have developed that
interpretation, however, they must apply it faithfully.
84. 535 A.2d 433 (Me. 1988).
85. Justice Wathen wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Sconik. See id. at 437.
86. The concept of a "power" is well established in the common law of property,
and is not always linked, as it was in Worthley, with will construction. For a discus-
sion of powers of appointment under Maine law, see Moore v. Emery, 137 Me. 259,
274, 18 A.2d 781, 788 (1941). See generally RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF PRoPEMr"
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vision at issue stated:
FIFTH: I request that my friends, Harriet Fogg, and Reverend and
Mrs. Fred Robie of Sanford, Maine, shall insofar as possible specify
the disposition to be made of the remainder of my furniture and
furnishings, and I request that my Executor shall carry out the for-
malities of any such gift, sale or other disposition as they specify.8 7
The personal representative contended that if the provision created
a power of appointment, that power rested with the group as a
whole and could not survive the death of one of its members.08 If the
court accepted that reasoning, the personal items at issue would
pass through the residuary clause of the will. 9
The Law Court divided on whether the power survived the death
of one of its joint holders. Both the majority and dissent pulled only
three relevant cases on the survival of jointly held powers.90 Accord-
ing to the dissent, those three decisions all agreed that whether a
power of appointment survives the death of one of its joint holders
depends in a critical way on whether the power is "coupled with an
interest."'" As stated in James v. United States, the most recent of
the three decisions:
At common law it was also generally recognized that jointly held
powers could not be exercised by the survivors following the death
or incompetency of one of the holders of the power unless the in-
strument creating-the power provided that the power might be ex-
ercised by the survivors or unless the power was coupled with an
interest, i.e., the persons holding the power also possessed some
proprietary right in the subject matter over which the power was to
be exercised.
92
Both the majority and dissent in Worthley agreed that the power at
issue was not coupled with an interest.9 Therefore, if the Law Court
were to apply routinely the standard as declared in James, the
power would fail.
§§ 11, 12 (1986); 62 AM. JuR. 2D, Powers of Appointment and Alienation §§ 1-20
(1990); 1 SUGDEN ON POWERS (1856). The Restatement defines a power of appoint-
ment as "authority, other than as an incident of the beneficial ownership of property,
to designate recipients of beneficial interests in property." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 11.1.
87. Estate of Worthley, 535 A.2d at 434.
88. Id. at 435. The initial issue before the court was whether the will created a
trust, specific devise, or a power of appointment. The court unanimously agreed that
the will created a power of appointment. Id. at 434-35; id. at 437 (Wathen, J., dissent-
ing in part).
89. Id. at 437.
90. Id. at 436 n.3, 437. The three cases relied on by the court on this point were
Wilson v. Snow, 228 U.S. 217 (1913); Peter v. Beverly, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 532 (1836);
James v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 177 (1978).
91. Estate of Worthley, 535 A.2d at 437.
92. James v. United States, 448 F. Supp. at 179.
93. Estate of Worthley, 535 A.2d at 435 n.2; id. at 437 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
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The case was made more difficult for Chief Justice McKusick,
however, because the rule on survival of powers of appointment was
set against the general principle imbedded in Maine law and else-
where that wills should be construed to determine the intent of the
testator." As explained by the Law Court in Moore v. Emery-
The guiding principle of a court in construing a will is to deter-
mine the intent of the testator, which must be found from the par-
ticular language which he has used read in connection with the will
taken as a whole and in cases of doubt in the light of the surround-
ing circumstances. There is no particular magic in isolated phrases.
Language which may mean one thing when applied to one state of
facts may have to be interpreted differently when applied to an-
other. Precedents are of less importance than elsewhere in the law,
and to quite an extent each case must be considered by itself.0 5
This general principle counseled against rigid application of the ap-
parent rule on powers of appointment without first undertaking a
careful review of the entire will to determine the testator's intent.
For Chief Justice McKusick, the facts in Worthley manifested a
clear intent for the power to survive the death of one of its joint
holders, thereby accentuating the potential conflict between the gen-
eral principle on effectuating the intent of the testator and the spe-
cific rule on the survival of powers. Regarding the testator's intent,
Chief Justice McKusick noted first that she had identified the joint
holders of the power as her "friends," thereby indicating that her
confidence was with them not as a group only but "because each of
them was her friend. ' '96 Chief Justice McKusick concluded:
The death of one, therefore, would in no wray lessen the confidence
Miss Worthley reposed in the judgment of her two surviving
friends. The most sensible interpretation of Miss Worthley's intent
as set forth in the disputed provision of her will is that if one of her
trusted friends should die, she wished the remaining two confi-
dants, as her friends, to exercise their considered judgment about
how to dispose of her remaining furnishings."
In a similar vein, the property at issue involved Miss Worthey's in-
timate possessions, "which probably would carry special meaning for
certain of her friends surviving her."9' 8 It therefore seemed unlikely
that she intended such items to pass into the residuary to be "re-
duce[d] . . . to cash or other liquid assets" simply because of the
94. Id. at 435.
95. Moore v. Emery, 137 Me. at 277-78, 18 A.2d at 790 (and cases cited therein);
see also MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-603 (1980). Chief Justice McKusick in
Worthley relied on both those authorities. See Estate of Worthley, 535 A.2d at 435.
96. Estate of Worthley, 535 A.2d at 436.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 436-37.
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death of one of her three close friends.0 9
Thus Chief Justice McKusick was faced in Worthley with a con-
flict between a guiding principle of will construction and an appar-
ent rule regarding survival of powers of appointment. Maine case
law did not directly address the issue, except to note the great im-
portance of discerning the intent of the testator for will interpreta-
tion. Furthermore, the three cases addressing the particular ques-
tion apparently revolved around whether the power to appoint was
coupled with an interest. Chief Justice McKusick's answer to the
dilemma demonstrates how general legal principles implicit in an
area of the law may shape the reading of particular precedents so as
to maintain the integrity of the law.
Toward that end, Chief Justice McKusick first observed that the
relevant decisions failed to address the issue as clearly as the federal
district court in James had asserted. 100 In fact, of the two cases re-
lied on in James, only in Wilson v. Snow could it be said that the
coupling of a power with an interest actually overrode the intent of
the testator.1°0 As did the James court, the Supreme Court in Wil-
son based its decision on its own precedent in Peter v. Beverly.'
The Beverly decision, however, failed to support the position as-
serted in Wilson.
In Peter v. Beverly, the Supreme Court also had concluded that
the power was coupled with an interest and survived the death of
one of its holders. 03 Chief Justice McKusick correctly observed,
however, that the James court had misread the Beverly case, which
was considered a "point of origin" for later decisions on the issue.
10 4
The Beverly Court recited the "general rule" on survival of powers
of appointment, but explained that the rule as stated best character-
ized English case law rather than American. 0 5 In the American com-
mon law tradition, however, the "leading principle" was to deter-
mine and carry out the intent of the testator. 0 6 Chief Justice
McKusick in Worthley quoted at length the following summary
from Beverly:
99. Id. Chief Justice McKusick also observed that the disputed article of the will
failed to provide for the lapsing of the bequest into the residuary, unlike the other
articles in the will. Id. at 436.
100. Id. at 436 n.3.
101. In Wilson, the Supreme Court observed that the will in question appeared to
place a special confidence in the joint holder of the power who had predeceased the
testator. See Wilson v. Snow, 228 U.S. at 222. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that this manifestation of intent should override the coupling of the power with
an interest in the surviving joint holder. Id. at 224.
102. Id. at 224 (quoting summary of English common law rule in Peter v. Beverly,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 532, 564 (1836).
103. Peter v. Beverly, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 566-67.
104. Estate of Worthley, 535 A.2d at 435-36 n.3.




In the American cases, there seems to be less confusion and ni-
cety on this point; and the courts have generally applied to the
construction of such powers, the great and leading principle which
applies to the construction of other parts of the will, to ascertain
and carry into execution the intention of the testator. When the
power is given to executors, to be executed in their official capacity
of executors, and there are no words in the will warranting the con-
clusion, that the testator intended, for safety or some other object,
a joint execution of the power; as the office survives, the power
ought also to be construed as surviving. And courts of equity will
lend their aid to uphold the power, for the purpose of carrying into
execution the intention of the testator, and preventing the conse-
quences that might result from the extinction of the power .... 107
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Beverly, therefore, made clear
for Chief Justice McKusick that even the common law rule on sur-
vival of powers must be read in light of the general principle charac-
terizing will interpretation - discerning the intent of the testator.
Seeing the importance of that general principle in both Maine law
and the Supreme Court's Beverly decision, Chief Justice McKusick
then reinterpreted the holdings of Beverly and Wilson so as to
maintain their integrity with the underlying principle. He explained
that the coupling of a power with an interest gives a fairly clear indi-
cation of the intent of the testator that the power should survive the
death of one of its joint holders. The failure to couple a power with
an interest, however, means only that one clue to the testator's in-
tent is lost, and the court "must look for other intimations of [the
testator's] intent." 0 8 In Miss Worthley's case, the will included suf-
ficient other "intimations" to support a conclusion that the power of
appointment should survive.
Faced with a hard case and few decisions on point, it is neverthe-
less evident that Chief Justice McKusick did not see himself as free
to decide the case in accordance with his own sense of justice. Be-
cause the particular issue before him arose out of a body of common
law regarding interpretation of wills, his interpretation of the gen-
eral principles implicit in that body of law necessarily constrained
his decisionmaking and informed his reading of the relevant case
law. The process of developing a reasoned and consistent interpreta-
tion of the relevant case law unavoidably involved redefining (or
clarifying) particular decisions in an effort to maintain the integrity
of those decisions and their supporting principles. 10 Thus in Worth-
107. Estate of Worthley, 535 A.2d at 435-36 (quoting Peter v. Beverly, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) at 564).
108. Id. at 436 n.3.
109. Professor Dworkin has recognized that any reasonable interpretation of a
body of law must also recognize mistaken decisions - not all the cases will fit well
with the interpretation, and to the extent that the interpretation reasonably charac-
terizes the law, decisions to the contrary may simply be wrongly decided. See K.
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ley, a "general rule" on the survival of powers became, in the con-
text of wills, simply an "intimation" of the testator's intent. As with
Law as Integrity generally, the normative weight of the Worthley
decision depends on how well Chief Justice McKusick interpreted
the guiding principles in that area of the law, and how effectively he
used that interpretation to resolve the case at hand.110 This inter-
pretive process explains both the creative and constrained character
of Chief Justice McKusick's methodology.
IV. IN RE GARDNER: A BACKGROUND MORAL THEORY
As a model of jurisprudence, Law as Integrity recognizes a special
connection between legal and moral theory. When resolving particu-
larly hard cases, with sparse guidance from relevant past precedents
but important social or political concerns on the line, the common
law judge practicing Law as Integrity may properly resort to a back-
ground moral or political theory for guidance on the right answer to
the case at hand. In a very important way, therefore, Law as Integ-
rity insists that the law itself is more than just legal principles, but
is also set against a broader moral backdrop.
11 '
The manner in which legal and moral theory come together under
Law as Integrity highlights both the interpretive character of this
model of jurisprudence, and also its sharp difference from legal real-
ism in its many forms. When particular precedents fail to resolve a
new and especially troublesome legal problem, or when social
changes bring to light an old problem that has gone unrecognized,
the common law judge may draw upon moral theory only in a lim-
ited and constrained manner: the judge is not free to apply his own
moral perspective to resolve the issue. Rather, he looks to the law
itself - precedents, statutes, commentaries, and philosophies of
law' 2 - to discern the background moral theory that best appears
to explain or justify the law's character.1 3 Here, too, the method is
interpretive in nature. Based upon his or her understanding of the
law, the judge seeks to construct a moral theory that appears accu-
rately to explain the general moral principles upon which the law is
based. 4 The background theory of the law, as general as it may be,
can then be brought to bear on the particular hard case at hand.
Chief Justice McKusick's majority opinion in In re Gardner sug-
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 118-23.
110. See supra note 36.
ill. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 110-18.
112. The Law Court has recognized all these sources as important areas to draw
upon when considering hard cases of law that may require overturning a past prece-
dent. See Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987-98 (Me. 1982).
113. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 189-90; R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 101-05, 125-26.
114. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 125-27.
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gests the affinity of his common law jurisprudence with Law as In-
tegrity, even at the outer edges of its interpretive character. This
frequently discussed case" 5 involved whether the Law Court would
respect an incompetent person's wish, declared before he lost com-
petency, that he not be kept alive in a comatose state by life-sus-
taining medical procedures. 16 The issue had not reached Maine's
highest court before that case, and consequently the Law Court had
before it no controlling legal precedents. The court split four to
three on the issue, with both the majority and the dissent relying on
background moral principles to explain their decisions. Chief Justice
McKusick's majority opinion clearly depicts his Law as Integrity ju-
risprudence, and strongly indicates what may be his understanding
of the background moral theory that best explains the common law.
In Gardner, the superior court had found by clear and convincing
evidence that Gardner when competent had declared his desire not
to be maintained in a persistent vegetative state by life-sustaining
medical procedures."2  Chief Justice McKusick emphasized at a
number of points in his opinion that the issue before the court in no
way presented a question of "substituted judgment" - i.e., what a
person who had not made his wishes known when competent would
have chosen in that situation after losing competency.118 Even with
115. The case was first noted in the pages of this journal while it was pending in
superior court. See Comment, Maine's Living Will Act and the Termination of Life-
Sustaining Medical Procedures, 39 MAINE L. Rav. 83, 106 n.89 (1987). Since then, the
case has been discussed in the Maine Law Review in Note, In re Gardiner: With-
drawing Medical Care From Persistently Vegetative Patients, 41 MAINE L Ray. 447
(1989); Comment, Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Patients' Rights -
Privacy Rights, 42 MAINE L Ray. 193 (1990).
116. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950 (Me. 1987).
117. Id. at 949. Once the Law Court understood the superior court to have made a
factual finding that Gardner would have wanted life-sustaining procedures discontin-
ued, that finding would stand unless "clearly erroneous." Id. at 953 (citing Taylor v.
Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 153 (Me.
1984)). This finding set the parameters on the moral issue at stake in the case -
whether the court would respect a clear declaration by a competent individual that he
not receive medical care, rather than whether the court would make a decision re-
garding medical care on behalf of an incompetent individual.
The dissent sharply took issue with the majority on this factual finding, and under-
stood the superior court to have found Gardner's statements to be "casual and of a
general nature." Id. at 957 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 950, 952 n.4. As discussed infra at notes 126-31 and accompanying
text, the Chief Justice found the moral value of personal autonomy strongly implicit
in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Had Gardner not stated clearly his desire to be
free of life-sustaining medical procedures, however, that well-established background
theory would have been lost to the court. In its place would have been an ambiguous
collection of moral principles implicated in the doctrine of "substituted judgment."
See Comment, Maine's Living Will Act and the Termination of Life-Sustaining
Medical Procedures, 39 MAI m L. REv. 83, 103 n.83 (1987) (discussing "substituted
judgment"). The court would have to determine what might be in the best interest of
the incompetent person, or what a reasonable person would have chosen in such a
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the facts narrowed down in this manner, however, the Law Court
still had few precedents upon which to draw. The relevant cases
available to the court involved the physician's duty to treat a pa-
tient only with that patient's informed consent. The two primary
Maine decisions on that issue, however, did not involve life-sus-
taining medical care.
In both Downer v. Veilleux"19 and Woolley v. Henderson,'20 the
Law Court had recognized "the doctrine of informed consent as an
actionable species of medical negligence." " ' Under that analysis,
however, a court typically asks first, whether the defendant/physi-
cian provided the plaintiff/patient prior to a particular treatment
with all the information that a reasonable physician would have pro-
vided; and second, whether a reasonable person in the patient's situ-
ation would have consented to the treatment, knowing that informa-
tion.122 Although arguably relevant when an incompetent person has
not made his wishes known regarding life-sustaining treatment, the
Law Court's negligence analysis was of little help in the Gardner
scenario - when an incompetent patient had earlier declared while
competent that he would not want life-sustaining medical
procedures.
In both Downer and Woolley, the court also recognized a more
limited realm of medical malpractice sounding in battery, involving
cases where the physician treated the patient "either against the pa-
tient's will or substantially at variance with the consent given.' 23
That branch of the doctrine of informed consent would suggest re-
specting Gardner's stated wishes, except for the following factors:
Gardner had become incompetent and could not make clear his
desires at the current time; furthermore, he would surely have con-
sented to initial medical treatment; and finally, he would die if med-
ical treatment were discontinued. 2 ' A straightforward reliance on
legal principles from the battery analysis would also have to con-
front the state's well-established legal right to prevent suicide and
situation. Against these concerns would be the state's interest in protecting from
abuse those unable to protect themselves. See generally id. at 133-34, 144-47 (dis-
cussing moral values that compete against a decision to discontinue life-sustaining
medical care).
119. 322 A.2d 82 (1974).
120. 418 A.2d 1123 (1980).
121. Id. at 1128 & n.3 (citing Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d at 89-91).
122. Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d at 1131-32. For a discussion of these two
issues, see Comment, supra note 118, at 126-29.
123. Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d at 1133 (quoting Downer v. Veilleux, 322
A.2d at 89).
124. The dissent in Gardner strongly emphasized that Gardner's declarations had
been made without any knowledge of the specific medical condition he would later
face; and in that sense the consent would fail to meet the standard necessary for a




to intervene to protect the incompetent. 12 5
In short, the court had before it in the common law battery analy-
sis only a partial answer to Gardner's plight, and the battery analy-
sis itself could not fully support a decision to terminate life-sus-
taining medical care. Characteristic of Law as Integrity, Chief
Justice McKusick resolved this hard case by going beyond those
particular legal decisions to a background moral theory that ap-
peared for him to carry particular explanatory force, not only for
this case but perhaps for the common law itself.
Chief Justice McKusick began by noting that "resolution of that
narrow question [regarding life-sustaining procedures] must begin
with a recognition of the long-standing importance in our Anglo-
American legal tradition of personal autonomy and the right of self-
determination.' 126 Chief Justice McKusick buttressed his point by
quoting from John Stuart Mill's important work, On Liberty:
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over him-
self, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.'"
From John Stuart Mill, Chief Justice McKusick moved back into
the law, quoting from an 1891 United States Supreme Court
decision:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer-
ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law. 
28
Finally, Chief Justice McKusick drew even closer to the issue before
him, relying upon Judge Cardozo's statement of the individual pa-
tient's right to control medical care:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body;, and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages.""
None of the quoted passages specifically addressed terminating life-
sustaining medical procedures,2 0 and yet each was used by Chief
125. See, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 106(6), 201(1)(C), 204 (1983); Adult
Protective Services Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3470-3488 (Supp. 1990).
126. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at 950.
127. Id. (quoting J. S. MML, ON LmERTvy (reprinted in J. S. MILL, Tiias EssAys 5.
15) (1975) (first published in 1859)).
128. Id. (quoting Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250-51 (1891)).
129. Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-
30, 105 N.E. 92-93 (1914)).
130. Chief Justice McKusick's opinion in In re Gardner also cites and quotes ex-
tensively from what had become a substantial body of case law in other states sup-
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Justice McKusick as indicative of a broader moral background the-
ory upon which the Anglo-American legal tradition at least in part
rests. 131
Having articulated the central importance of personal autonomy
to the common law, Chief Justice McKusick then turned to Maine's
own common law doctrine of informed consent, noting that "when a
competent patient has expressly refused to receive some form of
medical care, a doctor would be acting tortiously if he insisted on
providing the treatment against his patient's will.' 3 2 He described
that principle explicitly in terms of the general background theory
of personal autonomy earlier established: "The rationale of this rule
lies in the fact that every competent adult has the right to forego
treatment, or even cure, if it entails what for him are intolerable
consequences or risks, however unwise his sense of values may be to
others." 3 Having recognized the right of a competent person to re-
fuse life-sustaining medical care and Gardner's own personal decla-
ration while competent that he not receive such treatment, Chief
Justice McKusick saw no persuasive reason for refusing to give legal
force to that decision once Gardner lost competency:
Gardner is in a persistent vegetative state without any hope for
porting the right of persons to refuse life-sustaining medical procedures. See In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d at 951-53. Since the Gardner decision, courts have continued to
affirm that right. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); Mc-
Connell v. Beverly Enterprises-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989); Conservator-
ship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988). The United States
Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841
(1990), also recognized that a person has a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment." Id. at 4920. The Court declined, however, to
base that interest on the constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 2867 n.7. See also id.
at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at 953)).
131. A number of this century's most distinguished jurists have shared the view
that a judge may appropriately bring to bear on the resolution of a hard case of un-
certain law the judge's best interpretation of the legal or moral principles that charac-
terize the law generally. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (Powell, J., for the Court); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., for
the Court); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63-67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-27 (1937) (Cardozo, J., for the Court).
All of these cases involved hard cases of constitutional interpretation - the meaning
of the phrase "due process of law."
The judge engaging in this interpretive process is not bringing to bear on the ques-
tion a personal philosophy, but is instead constrained to draw upon the broad moral
principles characteristic of the law generally, or in the words of Justice Cardozo, "to
be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. at 325.
In that sense, legal precedents do not simply run out, and legal rights may be said to
exist even though they have not yet been explicitly recognized by a court. See R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 81, 104-105.
132. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at 951 (citing Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d at
1133 & n.11 and Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d at 89).
133. Id. (quoting Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d at 91).
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change for the better .... Gardner's decision made clear in ad-
vance of his injury applies specifically to the circumstances in
which he now exists. We see no reason not to respect Gardner's
personal decision and allow the discontinuation of life-sustaining
treatment.""'
Chief Justice McKusick saw the right to terminate medical care as
particularly important for the person in a persistent vegetative
state, and reached that conclusion again based upon general princi-
ples of personal autonomy. He explained that when Gardner made
his earlier declarations regarding life-sustaining medical treatment,
he likely had in mind "the utter helplessness of the permanently
comatose person, the wasting of a once strong body, and the submis-
sion of the most private bodily functions to the attention of
others."' 5
Chief Justice McKusick could not fully resolve this case without
addressing various "state interests" generally put forward as rele-
vant to a decision to discontinue life-sustaining care,130 and in par-
ticular the state interests in protecting those unable to protect
themselves, and in preventing suicide. In each case, he found the
answer in his background theory of personal autonomy. Regarding
protection of the incompetent from abuse, he stated that "the
greater risk of abuse lies in disregarding such specifically declared
personal decisions and in imposing life-sustaining procedures upon
the patient contrary to his express will.' 37 Chief Justice McKusick
likewise rejected any analogy to suicide, since the personal choice at
issue was to refuse medical procedures that simply prolonged "the
natural dying process set in motion by [Gardner's] physiological in-
ability to chew or swallow." 38
134. Id. at 954. Although the court did not mention it, additional legal sources
justifying this conclusion are found in federal and state laws granting rights to the
disabled to interact on terms as nearly equal to the nondisabled as are reasonably
possible. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-
476 (101st Congress); Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796i; Maine Human
Rights Act, M_ Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4551-4602 (1959 & Supp. 1990). Arising out
of those statutes is the general principle that an incompetent person ought not to be
denied rights otherwise available to competent persons, simply by virtue of the in-
competency. This general principle comes into play only when an incompetent person
declares his or her wishes before losing competency, and does not suggest an outcome
when an incompetent person fails to declare his or her wishes before losing
competency.
135. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at 953.
136. Id. at 955. Those state interests are: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the
protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and
(4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." See, e.g., Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (1977).
137. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at 955.
138. Id. at 956. Chief Justice MeKusick also rejected any special symbolism in the
discontinuation of nutrition and hydration, explaining.
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Chief Justice McKusick concluded his analysis by strongly assert-
ing that the Law Court was in no way making a quality-of-life deter-
mination. Here too he drew upon the background moral theory that
supported his decision throughout:
Thus Gardner has himself done the balancing of his own values
and their bearing on the question of whether to be kept alive in a
persistent vegetative state by artificial means. That personal
weighing of values is the essence of self-determination. In ruling to
respect the personal choice made by Gardner, therefore, we judges
do not ourselves engage in an independent assessment of the value
of his life. We are only recognizing and effectuating his right of
self-determination. 39
In short, Chief Justice McKusick resolved this hard case by find-
ing implicit in the common law tradition a strong underlying sup-
port for personal autonomy. The particular precedents he had
before him did not answer the Gardner question. Yet those prece-
dents established the clear importance of personal autonomy in the
common law tradition. The importance of that general background
principle in turn exerted a "gravitational force" upon the case
before him,140 compelling respect for Gardner's clearly expressed
wishes. Since it was rooted in background principles implicit in the
common law, the Gardner decision maintained the law's integrity
while at the same time recognizing a right not clearly declared previ-
ously. Thus, the Chief Justice carefully channeled his creative devel-
opment of the law through his Law as Integrity jurisprudence.
V. WHY LAW AS INTEGRITY?
Chief Justice McKusick's common law jurisprudence generally re-
flects the interpretive method identified by Professor Dworkin as
Law as Integrity. When Chief Justice McKusick in Gardner looked
to the general character of the Anglo-American legal tradition for
help in resolving a particularly difficult legal issue, he was also walk-
ing a path well traveled by earlier American jurists. Justice Frank-
furter of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California
described that same interpretive process when addressing the mean-
ing of "due process of law":
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges
[Alny such symbolism lies in the reciprocity of giving and receiving, such as
occurs between parent and infant. The symbolism is lost in the artificial
introduction of food and fluid into the body of someone in Gardner's unfor-
tunate condition.
Id. at 954-55 (citation omitted). But see id. at 958-59 (Clifford, J., dissenting); see
also Comment, supra note 118, at 144-47 and accompanying notes (discussing sym-
bolic importance of nutrition and hydration).
139. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at 955 (citation omitted).
140. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 115-16.
[Vol. 43:321
JURISPRUDENCE
at large. We may not draw on our merely personal and private no-
tions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial
function. Even though the concept of due process of law is not final
and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are
fused in the whole nature of our judicial process.... These are
considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling tradi-
tions of the legal profession.14'
Justice Harlan likewise maintained that resolution of hard cases of
constitutional law should reflect a "respect for the teachings of his-
tory, [and a] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society."' 42
Aside from its distinguished pedigree, however, why should the
Chief Justice (or anyone else, for that matter) follow a Law as Integ-
rity jurisprudence? What is it about that common law method that
makes it the appropriate theory for judicial decisiomaking? The
answer to this question in large part depends upon an understand-
ing of the nature of the political community which those court deci-
sions in part define.
The most obvious answer - or partial answer - is that judges
are not elected legislators, and should not be in the business of de-
claring new law based simply on their personal predilections. Chief
Justice McKusick offered this explanation himself, in his opinion in
Bell v. Town of Wells.'4s Yet this account does not address why a
judge should answer hard cases by reference to general moral or le-
gal principles implicit in the law, rather than simply to what is spe-
cifically declared in statutes or prior court decisions. The answer to
this question presents more fully the justification for Law as
Integrity.
Law as Integrity assumes that we understand our political com-
munity'" to be a shared moral enterprise.' 5 That is not to say that
141. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952) (footnote omitted) (citing B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PaOCESS). In Ziehm v. Ziehm, 433 A.2d 725
(Me. 1981), Chief Justice McKusick used Justice Frankfurters Rochin standard for
assessing due process, concluding that use of particular documents would not "offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples." Id. at 729 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
See supra note 131 for listing of other United States Supreme Court justices who
have used an interpretive method similar to Law as Integrity.
142. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.. concurring).
See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a dis.
cussion of the role of history in the Law as Integrity jurisprudence, see R. DwouN.,
supra note 1, at 227-28.
143. 557 A.2d at 168, 176 (Me. 1989). See also Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264-
65 (Me. 1987).
144. It seems apparent that any consistent jurisprudence at some point relies
upon an interpretation of the nature of the political community it in part describes.
See, e.g., L DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 167-75, 186-90, 411.
145. See R DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 170-75, 183-84. This understanding is at
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our nation shares a particular moral perspective - clearly it does
not. More accurately, we share a belief that our political community
is analogous to a moral actor;14 6 when the community acts through
its political institutions, its actions should be morally justifiable, and
in some important sense the community acts wrongly when it cannot
morally account for what it does."
7
Understanding our political community as a moral actor carries
with it certain requirements that in large part explain Law as Integ-
rity. First of all, like any moral actor the political community must
treat persons similarly who are in like circumstances. There can be
no moral justification for rewarding one person for his behavior in
certain circumstances and then turning around and punishing an-
other person for the same conduct in the same situation. To the ex-
tent actions are morally justified, a moral actor is compelled to re-
spond in a like manner to persons in comparable situations. As has
been recognized at least since Aristotle, justice requires treating like
persons in a like manner."
8
In addition, a moral actor must justify his or her morally relevant
actions." 9 That is, the actor must explain those actions in terms of
the general moral principles relevant to the particular activity at is-
sue. In other words, moral justification involves drawing from a par-
ticular activity the central moral principles that appear to explain it.
When confronted with situations of like character, the person ought
to constrain his or her actions by reference to those same moral
principles - or explain in a morally relevant way why this situation
is different. Moral actors maintain their integrity to the extent they
are consistently able to act in accordance with those general
least as old as Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk. 1. An interpretation of the
nature of the political community in no way asserts that our political institutions
always act in a manner consistent with this interpretation. Clearly it does not. See
Berea College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding state's
prosecution of Berea College for refusing to respect state segregation laws). Rather,
the interpretation is offered as the best understanding of the structure of our political
institutions and the purposes we expect them to advance. Because we understand our
community as a shared moral enterprise, we are able to criticize it for its failures to
act as it should.
146. Professor Dworkin discusses at length his understanding of the key aspects
characterizing a community that is sufficiently "concerned" with its fellow members
to believe they warrant equal respect in the application of the law. See R. DWORKIN,
supra note 1, at 195-202, 206-15. The Author will not discuss those components here,
but assumes them to be sufficiently met in the United States.
147. The importance of moral justification for actions taken by our political insti-
tutions is seen also in the fact that such actions are generally characterized by the use
or threat of coercion. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 93-94.
148. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk. III, ch. IX, at 117-21 (1946) (E. Barker ed.);
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. V, ch. III, §§ 3-4.
149. People frequently act in situations having no moral ramifications. For exam-
ple, the decision whether to watch the Red Sox or the Cubs carries no moral ramifica-




It is important to emphasize that moral actors will very likely dis-
agree about the underlying principles that justify the conduct at is-
sue. They may even disagree about how to define what the conduct
at issue actually is. The point they agree upon, however, is that mor-
ally relevant actions ought to be in accordance with moral princi-
ples. The difficulty in identifying the appropriate principle in any
particular situation does not lessen the obligation to seek it out."O
There may be extensive argument among moral actors about the
proper conduct in a particular situation. They argue in the same
way, however; each one tries to construct the best interpretation of
those general principles characterizing the activity, and then each
applies that interpretation to the particular situation faced.
Under Law as Integrity, therefore, a judge called upon to resolve a
hard case of uncertain law starts from the premise that our political
community is a shared moral enterprise. The judge views the law
generally as a product of that political community, and as an histori-
cal record of the community's formal actions.151 The judge views the
decision to be made on the hard case not as a personal decision, but
as a decision on behalf of that political community. 15 2 Thus the
judge is compelled to answer that hard case in accordance with his
or her best understanding of the general principles characterizing
that area of the law, and if necessary, the law as a whole. To the
extent that a judge decides cases in this manner, he or she maintains
the integrity of the law by acting in accordance with its general jus-
tifying principles.
Thus the judge who practices Law as Integrity brings to decision-
making the important assumption that the political community is
also a shared moral enterprise - its formal actions must be justified
in a manner very much like those of any other, less abstract, moral
actor. In great measure, Law as Integrity rests upon this under-
standing of the political community. Consequently, the moral force
of this model of jurisprudence arises out of the persuasiveness of
this interpretation of our political community.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice McKusick provides us with no compendium of his
jurisprudence, no formal outline of how a judge should go about his
150. This general theme runs throughout Professor Dworkin's work. See, e.g., R.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 219; R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SfatuousLy, supra note 2,
at 105-25.
151. The Article here is addressing only our formal political institutions, which
may legitimately exercise legal coercion. Within the nation there are many other com-
munities - religious, political, personal - for which the law is not a formal record.
152. See supra note 37 for a discussion of the role of a judge's personal viewpoints
under Law as Integrity.
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work. His opinions, characterized by their clarity in words and
thought, do not generally pause to explain for the reader the Chief
Justice's understanding of his role. Yet that reticence, too, can be
understood to reflect a Law as Integrity jurisprudence. Under such a
regimen, judicial opinions are not forums for individual judges to set
forth and discuss their personal viewpoints. Rather, they represent
the arena in which the political community attempts to interpret
and apply consistently those legal principles that appear best to
characterize its legal system. The judge is charged with that onerous
task, not the less burdensome one of philosophical exegesis.
This Article has attempted to isolate in three of the Chief Jus-
tice's decisions the core elements of a Law as Integrity jurispru-
dence. There is an 'obvious weakness in placing too much weight on
only three judicial opinions. Yet those familiar with the Chief Jus-
tice's work should find in this interpretation a strong similarity to
the legal reasoning and method of many of his opinions. Likewise,
those who have been fortunate enough to have worked with Chief
Justice McKusick should not be at all surprised to find that a per-
son of his upstanding decency and personal integrity practices in his
professional calling a model of jurisprudence carrying those same at-
tributes. The legal community in Maine will greatly miss the Chief
Justice's leadership on the Law Court, but it is to be hoped that he
will remain intimately involved in shaping the law long after he has
left the bench.
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